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<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"I. Introduction<\/p>\n
The Social Democratic and Lobour Party (SDLP) and Sinn F\u00e9in are two major nationalist political parties in Northern Ireland. These two parties have had vastly different views regarding policy issues until the 1990s. They were extremely polarized on virtually every major issue. However, beyond the 1990s some have claimed that the policy agenda of Sinn F\u00e9in has become similar to the SDLP\u2019s. Has Sinn F\u00e9in evolved into a party indistinguishable of the SDLP? Do any differences currently endure? In order to answer these questions, a history of the two parties must be discussed. This will provide any historical difference that is evident between the two parties. An analysis of the policy differences that occurred prior to the 1990s must also be exposed. After analyzing the two political parties it will be evident that prior to the 1990s there were distinguishable historical and policy differences. Also, it will be clear that beyond the 1990s those differences became less distinguishable, but some difference still remained.<\/p>\n
II. History of the SDLP<\/p>\n
The SDLP party was founded on August 21, 1970. The party grew as an advocate for civil rights after incidents such as the Belfast Curfew . The party was formed from members of various nationalist and socialist political parties such as: the Republican Labour Party, the National Democrats, and Northern Ireland Labour Party. The founder of the party was Gerry Fitt. Fitt had a history in politicking and would become the leader of this newly founded party.<\/p>\n
The SDLP had a \u201cradical programme of wealth distribution, civil rights, friendship between Catholic and Protestant and cross-border co-operation, leading to eventual unity.\u201d The party also adopted the use of non-abstentionism ; it planned to represent its constituents at Stormont . The party hoped to gain Catholic and Protestant support by adopting these policies in its early years.<\/p>\n
The party argued for a constitutional change to reconcile the problems created from partition with the consent of the North. The SDLP\u2019s argument was made in 1972 through a policy document titled Towards A New Ireland. In this document, the SDLP declared:
\nIt follows from all of this that Britain must not again attempt to impose a settlement on this country. The key to her role now lies in her making an immediate declaration that she believes that it would be in the best interests of all sections of the Communities in both Islands, if Ireland were to become united on terms which would be acceptable to all the people of Ireland. Such declaration should contain no hint of coercion but should make it abundantly clear that this is Britain’s view and it is the one that she will positively encourage. No one in Ireland has demanded that such a declaration be translated into immediate Irish Unity. There are too many problems inherent in its implementations which will take time to resolve and which will require the setting up of democratic machinery [agreed and consented by both the North and South] for their resolution. In the meantime an interim system of Government for Northern Ireland should be set up which is fair to all sections.<\/p>\n
The SDLP firmly believed that Unionist consent was necessary for any future stance on the future of Ireland. By 1974, the SDLP was involved in a power sharing executive with Ulster Unionist. This was an attempt to put an end to the troublesome past by creating a situation where Unionist had to share power with Nationalist. This agreement emerged from the Sunningdale Conference held between December 6 and 9 in 1973. During the conference \u201cthe SDLP was promised a share in executive power, and the development of all-Ireland institutions.\u201d In an effort to carryout these promises \u201cthe British and Irish governments \u2026 agreed to set up a Council of Ireland, with representatives from north and south to administer matters of common interest.\u201d Sunningdale would not prove to be the last of the peace process: \u201cThere may have been some slender unionist support for, or at least resignation to, power-sharing. There was virtually none for a Council of Ireland.\u201d In 1979, John Hume would become the new SDLP leader due to Fitt\u2019s resignation \u201con the grounds that the party was becoming too nationalist.\u201d<\/p>\n
During the 1980s the SDLP would take a new approach in discussing ways to bring peace and stability to Ireland. John Hume was also fearful of the growing power of provisional Sinn F\u00e9in. To remedy these issues and to strengthen the party\u2019s governmental position the New Ireland Forum was setup to take place at Dublin Castle. The result of this forum was a published report outlining three options: \u201ca confederal Ireland, a united Ireland (unitary state), or joint sovereignty.\u201d Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK) during this time, completely dismissed the findings of the forum stating \u201cthat is out\u201d after each proposal. The \u201cout \u2026 out \u2026 out speech\u201d severely damaged Anglo-Irish relations. This blunder would lead to another component of the peace process. That component was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This agreement gave the Irish government an advisory role in Northern Ireland\u2019s government while confirming that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK unless a majority of its citizens agreed to join the Republic.
\nFrom the 1980s and beyond many of Hume\u2019s ideas have been implemented into various aspects of the peace process. For his contributions to the peace process and advocacy for non-violence during that process he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998.<\/p>\n
III. History of Sinn F\u00e9in<\/p>\n
Sinn F\u00e9in was a party that traditionally advocated for the use of abstentionism. During Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s Ard Fheis (annual party conference) in 1970 a vote was cast to end this traditional stance. Many members were against this decision. Some of these members, Sean McStiofain and Rauri \u00d3 Br\u00e1daigh , walked out of the conference to form Provisional Sinn F\u00e9in and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). After the formation of Sinn F\u00e9in, the party did very little political organizing, they spoke on behalf of the PIRA, and they practiced abstentionism. These facts made it difficult for Sinn F\u00e9in to be viewed as anything more than the political sector for the PIRA in its early years.<\/p>\n
Sinn F\u00e9in and the PIRA, the Provisional Republican Movement, believed that the British could be removed from Northern Ireland through the use of a PIRA military campaign :
\nthe Provisional IRA’s strategy was to use as much force as possible to cause the collapse of the Northern Ireland administration and to inflict enough casualties on the British forces that the British government would be forced by public opinion to withdraw from Ireland.\u201d A policy described by Sean MacStiofain as, “escalation, escalation and escalation”. This was modelled on the success of the Irish Republican Army in the Irish War of Independence 1919-1922 and was articulated in slogans such “Victory 1972”. However, this policy failed to take into account the strong unionist commitment to remain within the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n
By the mid-1970s, the idea of a quick military victory leading to British withdrawal was fading. Secret meetings between leaders of the Provisional Republican Movement and the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, concluded with a PIRA ceasefire. The ceasefire was to be in effect from February 1975 until January of 1976. During that time, Rees was trying to bring the Provisional\u2019s into peaceful politicking. Critics of the PIRA leadership felt that the ceasefire was disastrous for the PIRA since it led to many difficulties within the organization. The ceasefire broke down in January 1976.<\/p>\n
One of the most prominent critics of the ceasefire, Gerry Adams, would become the Vice President of Sinn F\u00e9in in 1978. A new strategy termed the \u201clong war\u201d would be implemented under Adams guidance. This strategy involved the reorganization of the PIRA into small units, acceptance that their campaign would last for many years before being successful, and increased importance on political activity through Provisional Sinn F\u00e9in. The PIRA would carryout an armed campaign while Sinn F\u00e9in would carryout a propaganda campaign. They also would be the public and political voice of the Provisional Republican Movement. This strategy would move Sinn F\u00e9in towards an existence involved in full-time politicking.
\nIn 1977, PIRA prisoners were stripped of their political status. In response, over five hundred prisoners refused to wash or wear prison clothes in an incident known as the Dirty Protest. The Dirty Protest evolved into the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike. This strike involved seven PIRA members starving themselves to death in an effort to regain their political status. Also, there were work stoppages and large demonstrations all over Ireland in support of the hunger strikers. Bobby Sands was the first of the hunger strikers to die and over one-hundred thousand people attended his funeral. After the success of PIRA hunger strikers in mobilizing support and helping to win elections in 1981, Sinn F\u00e9in increasingly devoted its time and resources to electoral politics. This policy became known as the “Ballot Box in one hand and the Armalite in the other.” This was a strategy where elections were contested by Sinn F\u00e9in, while the PIRA continued to pursue a paramilitary action against the British army.<\/p>\n
In the 1980s, the PIRA attempted to escalate the conflict. The attempted escalation did not prove to be successful; movement leaders increasingly looked for a political compromise to end the conflict. Gerry Adams entered talks with the SDLP leader, John Hume, and secret talks were also conducted with British officials. At this time Adams increasingly tried to promote separation between Sinn F\u00e9in and the PIRA. Within the Provisional Republican Movement, the new strategy was known as the tactical use of armed struggle. A strategy devoted to ending the reliance on the use of arms and placing Sinn F\u00e9in into a position devoted to full-time politicking. In 1986, the idea of full-time politicking would become a reality at the Sinn F\u00e9in Ard Fheis when the vote to drop abstenionism was passed.<\/p>\n
IV. Policy Differences between the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in Up Until the 1990s<\/p>\n
A historical difference from the inception of the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in up until the 1990s is evident. It has become clear that the SDLP grew out of the civil rights movement, the policy of non-abstentionism, and devoted to bringing peace to Ireland. Also, it has become clear that Sinn F\u00e9in was born out of disagreement with Official Sinn F\u00e9in concerning the use of abstentionism. Sinn F\u00e9in went on to play a propaganda role in the PIRA\u2019s campaign of violence devoted to withdrawal of the British by any means necessary.<\/p>\n
Now policy differences must be exposed to continue analyzing the difference between the two political parties. The policy differences between the two parties center around five main issues: their focus, their views of Unionist, their views of Britain\u2019s role in the conflict and its future role, their views regarding Unionist consent, and their positions on the use of violence.<\/p>\n
The focus of the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in has been significantly different. The SDLP was focused on the concept of divided communities. The party believed that the most important thing was to reconcile the two communities in order to make progress. The SDLP has focused less on the idea of an Irish nation; \u201cit focuses on people rather than territory; it speaks of a legacy of conflict which must be transcended\u2026\u201d However, Sinn F\u00e9in was focused on the concept of a divided island. The party believed that partition is the problem and if Northern Ireland and the Republic were made into one Irish nation progress will follow: \u201cThe party is dedicated to the achievement of a united Ireland.\u201d For Sinn F\u00e9in the reconciliation of the divided communities will naturally occur once territorial partition is abolished.<\/p>\n
The view of Unionist is another issue that differs between the two parties. The SDLP accepts Unionist as being British if Unionist viewed themselves as being British. The SDLP\u2019s solution to political settlement in Northern Ireland is to recognize the divisions of national identity within the community. According to the SDLP, the division of identity cannot be ignored. The SDLP believes that until the differences in identity are recognized little can be done to mend the situation: \u201cThe Party has acknowledged the presence of an alternative Ulster-Protestant-British tradition on the island, endorsing a two-tradition, equal legitimacy approach. The primary objective is national reconciliation not liberation.\u201d Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s approach to their view of Unionist is quite different. Sinn F\u00e9in views Unionist as Irish with their own set of peculiar traditions: \u201cthe position of Sinn Fein towards formal institutional recognition of the Ulster-Protestant identity [as British] has not shifted\u2026There is to be none. Sinn F\u00e9in refuses to recognize the Unionist view of being British. According to Sinn F\u00e9in, Unionist are Irish and do not deserve recognition as British regardless of their beliefs.<\/p>\n
Britain\u2019s role in the conflict and its future role is another source of debate between the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in. The SDLP blames Britain for the partition of the island and believes that they should stay to help reconcile the problems:
\nJohn Hume of the SDLP said that the British government should consider\u2026in its search for a political solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland\u2026an \u2018agreed Ireland\u2019 where the British government would declare that its objective was to bring the two main traditions in Ireland together in reconciliation and agreement.\u201d<\/p>\n
Sinn F\u00e9in is convinced that Britain has selfish reasons for remaining and should leave as soon as possible: \u201cThe only solution to the present political conflict in Ireland is the ending of partition, a British disengagement from Ireland and the restoration to the Irish people of their right to sovereignty, independence and national self-determination.\u201d<\/p>\n
Unionist consent is a highly contested issue between the two parties. The SDLP believes that Unionist consent is necessary for any constitutional change to take place regarding the status of Northern Ireland. This is considered a precursor for a united Ireland within the party. On the other side of the spectrum, Sinn F\u00e9in believes that reconciliation of partition and British withdrawal should be the priority. As a result of the success of that goal, Unionist consent will come naturally:
\nIn effect, Sinn Fein\u2019s historical view appeared to remain intact, namely that Unionist consent and allegiance would be a consequence of the creation of Irish unity [partition and withdrawal]. For the SDLP, such consent was a prerequisite for the establishment of a united Ireland.<\/p>\n
The view on the issue regarding the use of violence was another policy difference between the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in. The SDLP was opposed to the use of violence as a means to reconcile any of the problems within Northern Ireland. The SDLP states, \u201cThroughout the course of the last thirty-five years, the SDLP has never deviated from its core values. We have always stood completely opposed to all violence, arguing that it was not only morally wrong but politically bankrupt as well because violence always destroys that which it claims to defend.\u201d Sinn F\u00e9in was the political arm of the violent PIRA organization for much of its early existence. Sinn F\u00e9in was devoted to the creation of a united Ireland by any means necessary, including violence.<\/p>\n
V. Modern History and Policy: The SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in after the 1990s<\/p>\n
In this section, a brief history of the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in starting in the 1990s is explored to show any historical difference in the modern era. After the current history has been discussed an analysis of any current policy differences that remain will be conducted.<\/p>\n
During 1988 John Hume held a series of talks with Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn F\u00e9in, in an attempt to convince Sinn F\u00e9in that the PIRA should end its campaign of violence. In 1993, the party supported the Downing Street Declaration . In 1996, the SDLP concentrated on multi-party talks that were being conducted. In April of 1998, these talks ended with the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). In 2001, John Hume retired as leader of the party and was succeeded by Mark Durkan. As the new leader, Durkan had to deal with the growing electoral challenge by Sinn F\u00e9in, which became the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland.<\/p>\n
In 1993, Sinn F\u00e9in entered into renewed talks with the SDLP. After the announcement of a second PIRA ceasefire in 1997, Sinn F\u00e9in was allowed to participate in the multi-party talks leading to the GFA. Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s growing participation in the political process gave an increased electoral threat to the SDLP. In 2001, Sinn F\u00e9in became largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland.<\/p>\n
The policy changes from the 1990s to the present have led many to believe that Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s agenda is virtually the same as the SDLP. The main policy agenda of the SDLP has remained intact. However, Sinn F\u00e9in has implemented policy changes regarding their view of Unionist, Britain\u2019s role in the conflict and its future role, and its position on the use of violence. These policy changes are virtually the same as the SDLP\u2019s long-standing policies. Sinn F\u00e9in has traditionally viewed Unionist as Irish with peculiar traditions. This policy has shifted to an acceptance that there are two competing traditions on the island. Sinn F\u00e9in has even gone as far as to admit that Unionist have a distinct identity. The traditional view of Sinn F\u00e9in regarding Britain\u2019s role in the conflict and its future role has been that Britain has had selfish reasons for remaining and should leave immediately. Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s \u201cdemands for immediate British withdrawal have been superseded by calls for \u2018constructive disengagement\u2019.\u201d This is merely a restructuring of words. In the end, this policy matches the SDLP\u2019s policy for Britain to help reconcile some of the problems before a complete withdrawal. Regarding the policy of the use of violence; Sinn F\u00e9in was born as the political wing of a violent organization. The party advocated for the use of violence as a means to an end for most of its existence. The party has slowly disengaged from its involvement with the PIRA over the years, but this policy has undergone an even greater shift: \u201cThis has also meant a greater separation of the political from the military, exemplified most startlingly in Adams\u2019 assertion that \u2018Sinn F\u00e9in is not the IRA. Sinn F\u00e9in is not involved in armed struggle. Sinn F\u00e9in does not advocate armed struggle.\u2019\u201d In the end, Sinn F\u00e9in has managed not to change their position on Unionist consent. To Sinn F\u00e9in this remains to be the consequence of a change rather than a prerequisite:
\nIn arguing that the consent and allegiance of Unionists were \u2018essential ingredients for a lasting peace\u2019 Sinn F\u00e9in was not stipulating that Unionist consent was a precursor for the exercise of self-determination. Rather, Sinn F\u00e9in was in effect acknowledging that the result of the exercise of self- determination, presumably a unitary Irish state, could only be successful once it enjoyed the allegiance of unionists.<\/p>\n
The current leader of the SDLP, Durkan, stated it best when he said: \u201c\u2026that anyone wanting to gaze into a crystal ball to predict future Sinn F\u00e9in policy, only need look at the present SDLP policy to see what it is going to be.<\/p>\n
VI. Conclusion
\nUp until the 1990s there were many historical and policy differences between the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in. The SDLP was born out of the civil rights movement while Sinn F\u00e9in grew out of a campaign of violence. The two parties were polarized on many policy issues including their focus, view of Unionist, Britain\u2019s role in the conflict and its future role, Unionist consent, and the use of violence. After the 1990s the historical differences began to fade as the two parties participated in many of the same milestones. The polarization on policy issues also became virtually nonexistent; the only exception being the issue of Unionist consent. What is the difference between the SDLP and Sinn F\u00e9in? The answer to this question has become clear. Up until the 1990s the differences between the two parties were huge, ranging from historical to policy differences. After the 1990s, the two parties have become virtually indistinguishable from a modern historical and policy perspective.<\/p>\n
VII. Bibliography
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Brendan Lynn, \u201cAbstentionism: Sinn F\u00e9in Ard Fheis, 1-2 November 1986
\n– Summary of the Issue,\u201d http:\/\/cain.ulst.ac.uk\/issues\/abstentionism\/sum.htm (accessed: April 8, 2007).<\/p>\n
Democratic Dialogue, \u201cBritish? Irish? Or What,\u201d http:\/\/cain.ulst.ac.uk\/dd\/report7\/report7c.htm (accessed April 6, 2007)<\/p>\n
Eamonn Hughes, ed., Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland 1960-1990 (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1991).<\/p>\n
Encyclopedia Britannica, Online ed., s.v. \u201cSinn F\u00e9in,\u201d http:\/\/www.britannica.com\/eb\/article-9067944\/Sinn-Fein (accessed March 24, 2007).<\/p>\n
J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
\nAgn\u00e8s Maillot, New Sinn F\u00e9in: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Routledge, 2004).<\/p>\n
John Pike, \u201cIrish Republican Army (IRA), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, the Provos, Direct Action Against Drugs (DAAD),\u201d Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, http:\/\/www.fas.org\/irp\/world\/para\/ira.htm (accessed March 31, 2007).<\/p>\n
Jon Tonge, \u201cThe Political Agenda of Sinn Fein,\u201d in Stanyer, J. and Stoker, G. (eds) Contemporary Political Studies, Nottingham: Political Studies Association, 1997.<\/p>\n
Mark Simpson, \u201cNationalism: \u2018Split on Policing\u2019,\u201d http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/1\/hi\/northern_ireland\/2207460.stm (accessed April 10, 2007).<\/p>\n
Martin Melaugh, \u201cAbstracts on Organizations \u2013 \u2018S\u2019,\u201d http:\/\/cain.ulst.ac.uk\/othelem\/organ\/sorgan.htm#sf (accessed April 8, 2007)<\/p>\n
Martin Melaugh, \u201cA Chronology of the Conflict \u2013 1978,\u201d http:\/\/cain.ulst.ac.uk\/othelem\/chron\/ch78.htm (accessed April 8, 2007)<\/p>\n
Paul Mitchell and Rick Wilford, ed., Politics in Northern Ireland (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999).<\/p>\n
Sinn F\u00e9in, \u201cThe Sinn F\u00e9in\/SDLP Talks,\u201d http:\/\/www.sinnfein.ie\/pdf\/SF_SDLP_talks.pdf (accessed April 1, 2007).<\/p>\n
Social Democratic and Labour Party, \u201cTowards a New Ireland: Proposals by the Social Democratic and Labour Party,\u201d March 31, 2007, http:\/\/cain.ulst.ac.uk\/events\/crights\/sdlp1972.htm#declar.<\/p>\n
Social Democratic and Labour Party, \u201cA Short History of the SDLP,\u201d http:\/\/www.sdlp.ie\/about_us.html (accessed April 1, 2007).<\/p>\n
Tim Pat Coogan, Ireland in the 20th Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004).<\/p>\n
Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland\u2019s Ordeal 1966-1996 and the search for Peace (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996).<\/p>\n
T.W. Moody, The Course of Irish History (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1995).<\/p>\n
Photo by Sean MacEntee<\/span><\/a> <\/a><\/small><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"